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Focus: Criminal Jurisdiction 
Guyora Binder* AUTHORITY TO PROSCRIBE AND PUNISH 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES† 
Although criminal jurisdiction is usually exercised by governments, offences can 
also be proscribed by international law, and punishment can be imposed by interna-
tional tribunals. This article critically examines the legitimacy of such exercises of 
international criminal jurisdiction. It reasons that criminal law can plausibly be 
justified as a cooperative institution that achieves the public good of a rule of law, 
with its attendant benefits of social peace and equal dignity of persons. It then ar-
gues that such a beneficial rule of law requires a punishing authority with the execu-
tive capacity to protect those it claims to regulate. It would follow that criminal 
prohibitions may not be justifiable if they cannot be enforced systematically. Because 
the international legal system generally lacks the executive capacity required for a 
rule of law, the article suggests that international criminal punishment is justifiable 
as supportive of a rule of law only in rare circumstances. Finally, the article consid-
ers whether an alternative expressive rationale can, nevertheless, justify occasional 
prosecutions as useful in legitimizing international humanitarian norms. It ques-
tions whether the expressive benefits of such prosecutions can outweigh the expressive 
risks of promising protection the international legal system cannot deliver. 
Keywords: criminal law, international law, International Criminal Court, 
jurisdiction, punishment theory 
I Introduction 
Jurisdiction comprises the powers to legislate, to adjudicate, and to exe-
cute law. Criminal jurisdiction includes the legislative power to proscribe 
conduct and the adjudicative power to impose punishment for it. 
Thus far, criminal jurisdiction has received more attention from inter-
national law scholars than from criminal law scholars. International law-
yers see jurisdiction, generally, and criminal jurisdiction, in particular, as 
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essential attributes of state sovereignty. Thus, the criminal jurisdiction of a 
sovereign state is presumptively legitimate and raises a problem of interna-
tional law only when it conflicts with the sovereignty of another state. 
By contrast with international law scholarship, criminal law scholar-
ship questions the legitimacy of criminal jurisdiction itself. Criminal law 
theorists Antony Duff and George Fletcher have each argued that the 
justice of punishment depends not only on the accused’s desert, but also 
on the authority of some institution to impose punishment for the 
offence charged.1 Or, as Alejandro Chehtman puts it, ‘[T]he question 
about the justification for legal punishment is not only about whether it 
is permissible to punish an offender . . ., but rather, and crucially, about 
whether some particular body . . . has the right to do so.’2 Criminal pun-
ishment is, after all, an exercise of coercive power. In a liberal society, 
such a use of force must be justified as legitimate. 
Although criminal jurisdiction is usually exercised by national and sub-
national governments, offences can also be proscribed and punished by 
international law. Thus, international law has long defined such offences 
as piracy, slave trading, and war crimes, and more recently has added 
crimes against humanity and genocide.3 The power of states to collec-
tively proscribe international crimes was asserted after World War II 
when the victorious allies established an ad hoc tribunal to try Nazi lea-
ders not only for war crimes but also for the novel offences of crimes 
against humanity and aggression. It was reaffirmed by the creation of ad 
hoc international tribunals for the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
The Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court also pro-
scribes international crimes. This treaty confers jurisdiction on the Inter-
national Criminal Court to punish war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide committed (1) on the territory or by a national of any sig-
natory or (2) in a conflict the UN Security Council has asked the Court 
to investigate.4 The criminal law applied by the Court is defined by the 
1 Antony Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’ in Sa-
mantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds, The Philosophy of International Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) 589 at 591–2; George Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal 
Law: Foundations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 152–5, 247–52. 
2 Alejandro Chehtman, ‘Citizenship v Territory: Explaining the Scope of the Criminal 
Law’ (2010) 13 New Criminal Law Review 427 at 428. 
3 Ronald C Slye & Beth Van Schaack, International Criminal Law: Essentials (New York: 
Aspen, 2008) at 6–45. A sceptic might argue that customary international law did not 
proscribe these offences, but only permitted the state to proscribe them extraterrito-
rially. 
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, arts 5, 12, 
13 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute]. The court is required to defer to 
national courts willing and able to prosecute such crimes occurring on their territory 
or by their nationals; ibid, 17. Signatories may also invite the court to judge crimes 
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Rome Statute rather than by national codes.5 Signatories consent to the 
Court’s application of such law, and some states automatically incorpo-
rate treaties into their own law. Yet the collective definition of crimes by 
treaty is arguably an international exercise of legislative jurisdiction to 
proscribe. And certainly, that is true in so far as that law is applied to 
non-signatories in cases referred by the Security Council. 
Most international lawyers also hold that customary international law 
permits states – and presumably the international tribunals they establish 
– ‘universal’ adjudicative jurisdiction to punish serious international 
crimes occurring anywhere.6 Thus, one possible implication of charac-
terizing an offence as an international crime is this expansion of adjudi-
cative criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, in one of the few books in English 
on criminal jurisdiction, Chehtman analyses international criminal liabil-
ity as a form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.7 In addition to sup-
porting universal jurisdiction to punish international crimes, some 
international lawyers also hold that states and international organiza-
tions have a right of military intervention to prevent such crimes.8 This 
right of humanitarian intervention can be thought of as a kind of univer-
sal executive jurisdiction to enforce international criminal law. 
Because universal jurisdiction and humanitarian intervention are both 
primarily directed against misconduct by government officials, they chal-
lenge national sovereignty. Thus, Andrew Altman and Christopher Well-
man argue that states permitting systematic human rights abuses should 
forfeit the protections of sovereignty.9 Indeed, they reason that failure to 
committed on their territory or by their nationals; ibid, art 14. Yet the court may also 
exercise jurisdiction over a signatory adversely by finding it unwilling or unable to 
prosecute, and it may exercise jurisdiction over a non-signatory in a situation referred 
by the Security Council. 
5 Ibid, arts 6, 7, 8, 9. 
6 David Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Law’ in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds, The Philosophy 
of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 569 at 569–70 [Luban, 
‘Fairness’]. 
7 Alejandro Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 87–139 [Chehtman, Philosophical]. 
8 See Fernando Teson, ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’ in JL Holz-
grefe & Robert O Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 93 [Teson]. Cf. Bruno 
Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1 at 4 
[Simma]; Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’ 
(1999) 10 EJIL 23 at 25–6 [Cassese]. 
9 Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 69–95 [Altman & Wellman]. See also An-
thony Sammons, ‘The “Under-Theorization” of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications 
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protect a population from ordinary criminal violence suffices to justify 
the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by other states.10 
While this argument reduces the obstacle national sovereignty poses 
to international prosecution, it also raises the bar for justifying the exer-
cise of criminal jurisdiction by any authority. If government must earn 
the power to punish by protecting rights effectively and uniformly, crimi-
nal jurisdiction would seem to require a reliable enforcement capacity 
the international legal system lacks. This article will explore this problem 
from three points of view. 
First, it will develop a justification for the power to proscribe and pun-
ish that depends on its regular and effective exercise and its popular 
legitimacy. We will see that criminal law can plausibly be justified as a 
cooperative institution that achieves the public good of a rule of law, 
with its attendant benefits of social peace and security of status. Criminal 
law achieves authoritative resolution of disputes by mobilizing the com-
munity of those subject to its jurisdiction to accept its proscriptions and 
participate in its judgments of blame. It motivates this participation by 
promising to secure to each such person equal dignity as the bearer of 
inviolable rights. Conceived as a cooperative institution for producing a 
public good, criminal law is justifiable as beneficial in reducing violence, 
fair in repaying compliance with security and dignity, and legitimate in 
winning the assent of those it governs. Yet criminal law’s efficacy, fair-
ness, and legitimacy depend on its effectiveness in preventing much 
potential violence and punishing most actual violence. It follows that 
criminal prohibitions may not be justifiable if they cannot be enforced 
systematically. 
Second, the article will assess Alejandro Chehtman’s ‘jurisdictional 
theory of international crimes’11 in light of this proposition. Chehtman’s 
defence of international criminal liability is particularly salient because 
he agrees with criminal law theorists that the ‘scope of [the] . . . power 
to punish is determined by the reasons that justify . . . holding the power 
to punish.’12 Moreover, he agrees that punishment is justified by its con-
tribution to a rule of law that provides effective protection. Thus, Cheht-
man justifies criminal punishment as necessary to the public good of 
for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts’ (2003) 21 Berkeley J 
Int’l L 111 at 114 [Sammons]. 
10 Altman & Wellman, ibid at 76–82. Their argument is consistent with the recently pro-
posed doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’; see Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: 
Report of the Secretary-General, UNGAOR, 63d Sess, Agenda Items 44 and 107, UN Doc 
A/63/677 (12 January 2009) at para 11(a); Catherine Powell, ‘Libya: A Multilateral 
Constitutional Moment?’ (2012) 106 Am J Int’l L 298 [Powell]. 
11 Chehtman, Philosophical, supra note 7 at 87. 
12 Ibid at 56. 
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criminal law’s being ‘in force.’ This good secures the dignity of a popula-
tion by vindicating their rights against violence. On this basis, Chehtman 
objects to most extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction as practically 
incapable of achieving this benefit. Nevertheless, he defends extraterri-
torial jurisdiction to punish international crimes as the only means to 
punish leaders and officials pursuing inhumane policies. Yet we will find 
that it is very difficult to reconcile international criminal liability with his 
premises. It seems unlikely that these extremely rare prosecutions would 
achieve the good of international criminal law’s being ‘in force’ or make 
any tangible contribution to the security or dignity of the world’s popula-
tion. His claim that the good of international criminal law’s being ‘in 
force’ is achieved by any punishment, however infrequent and ineffec-
tual, contradicts his approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of states. 
Applying his normative premises consistently, however, we will find inter-
national criminal punishment justified only in the rare circumstance 
that foreign forces have already intervened effectively in defence of 
human rights. 
Third, the article will consider an alternative response to the critique 
that the international law of crimes is practically unenforceable. Perhaps 
the deficiencies of international criminal liability as a rule of law balance 
each other out: its expected ineffectuality arguably renders its expected 
illegitimacy acceptable and vice versa. David Luban argues that the con-
ventional liberal challenge to criminal punishment is less applicable to 
international tribunals for this reason.13 According to Luban, ordinary 
criminal punishment must be justified because the power to proscribe 
and punish can give rise to a comprehensive power to govern. Yet, since 
an international tribunal cannot parlay its very limited criminal jurisdic-
tion into such a power, it needs less justification. Whatever influence the 
International Criminal Court exercises, Luban argues, will be expressive, 
as it dramatizes the wrongdoing of a few selected offenders in spectacu-
lar trials.14 By such means, international criminal law, he argues, will 
‘build its legitimacy from the bottom,’15 persuading the global public to 
support its norms. The difficulty with this expressive justification for 
exemplary trials is that criminal punishment does not only express a 
message about the wrongdoer. It also expresses a message about the 
punishing authority: that it enforces a legal order committed to prevent-
ing or punishing all similar offences and vindicating the dignity of all 
such victims. Thus, criminal punishment confers credit as well as blame. 
13 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 581–4. 
14 Ibid at 574–6. 
15 Ibid at 588. 
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If international legal institutions lack the capacity and commitment to 
suppress international offences, however, that credit is undeserved. 
II The normative basis of criminal jurisdiction 
A PUNISHMENT AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 
Criminal punishment is a collaborative institutional practice of applying 
criminal laws. To justify punishment is, therefore, to explain the political 
legitimacy of an institution, not the moral permissibility of an act. As I 
have argued in previous work, familiar accounts of punishment as utilitar-
ian and retributive are more persuasive and more compatible with one 
another when punishment is conceptualized as an institutional practice. 
Retributivists commonly argue that an individual ethical duty to maxi-
mize utility could as easily justify framing and afflicting the innocent as 
punishing the guilty.16 Yet this argument is misapplied against utilitarian 
theories of punishment like Bentham’s which justify punishment as the 
outcome of a transparently utilitarian policy process. It invokes hypothe-
ticals in which well-meaning officials make the public believe that the 
guilty are being punished in order to achieve deterrence.17 Yet it would 
not maximize utility to empower officials to deceive the public in this 
way because public officials are governed by the same selfish motives as 
potential offenders and will serve the public welfare only in so far as they 
are properly incentivized and monitored.18 A publicly announced policy 
of permitting officials to deceive the public would sow insecurity and 
conflict, while a secret policy would violate the preconditions for the pur-
suit of utility and would be precluded in a properly designed utilitarian 
state. Stripped to its essentials, the retributivist argument is this: 
Premise 1: utilitarianism is the moral view that we should each serve only 
the value of utility. 
Premise 2: honesty and legality are rival values, external to utility. 
Conclusion: therefore utility demands that public officials lie and break 
the law. 
16 EF Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947) at 65. See 
also HJ McCloskey, ‘An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism’ (1957) 66 Philoso-
phical Review 466 at 468–9 for similar examples. 
17 Robert Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) at 70; John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ in Gertrude Ezorsky, ed, Philo-
sophical Perspectives on Punishment (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1973) 82 at 87. 
18 See generally, Guyora Binder & Nicholas Smith, ‘Framed: Utilitarianism and Punish-
ment of the Innocent’ (2000) 32 Rutgers LJ 115, explaining and supporting an institu-
tionalist interpretation of Bentham and other utilitarian thinkers. 
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Yet premise 1 mischaracterizes utilitarianism. Utilitarianism addresses 
society as a whole rather than individual actors. It recommends that soci-
ety organize itself politically so as to be able to achieve public utility by 
generating and implementing policy that can be seen to serve public wel-
fare when tested in open debate before a democratic public. This, in turn, 
requires that democratic citizens be able to monitor and supervise offi-
cials. These process requirements for the pursuit of public utility impose 
obligations on officials of honesty and fidelity to law. Thus, premise 2 is 
also false. As necessary procedural conditions for the identification of pub-
lic utility, honesty and legality are constitutive of that value. In short, critics 
of the utilitarian theory of punishment generate a pseudo-problem by mis-
characterizing it as a theory about how punishment is morally justified 
rather than a theory about how to make it politically legitimate. 
We can generate a parallel pseudo-problem for retributivism by identi-
fying it with a character like Detective Hank Quinlan in Touch of Evil, 
who achieves desert by planting evidence to frame the guilty, or a Mag-
num Force that conducts extrajudicial executions.19 Does not retributi-
vism compel individuals to inflict deserved punishment irrespective of 
whether it is authorized by law? The parallel implied argument is 
Premise 1: retributivism imposes a moral obligation to render desert 
without compromise. 
Premise 2: honesty and legality are rival values, external to retribution. 
Conclusion: therefore, public officials are sometimes bound to deceive 
the public or break the law to achieve desert. 
This argument is also flawed because it ignores the political structure of 
retributive punishment as a cooperative enterprise that imposes role-
bound obligations. In retributivism, the duty is not to harm or wreak 
revenge upon moral wrongdoers but to punish legal wrongdoers according 
to law. The primary point of retributive punishment is to impose authorita-
tive denunciation of wrongdoing and recognition of the equal dignity of 
victims and offenders as subjects of legal rights. Such authoritative denunci-
ation and recognition are necessarily collaborative enterprises because 
authority is a social construct. Individuals fulfil their duties of contributing 
to retributive punishment, not by inflicting suffering, but by collectively 
supporting the authority of law to impose blame and suffering. In Kant’s 
retributive theory, retributive justice cannot be achieved by an individual 
19 Touch of Evil, 1958, DVD (Universal City, CA: Universal International, 2000); Magnum 
Force, 1973, DVD (Burbank, CA: Warner Bros Pictures, 2001). A more sympathetic 
example is Detective McNulty, who facilitates perjured testimony to frame a brutal 
murderer for a different killing; ‘All Prologue,’ DVD: The Wire, Season 2, episode 6 
(New York, NY: HBO, 2008). 
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because it requires an effectual legal system that confers and protects 
rights. Moreover, justice requires that law be collectively self-imposed by 
those subject to it through participation in a democratic process of collec-
tive law making. Thus, the value of retributive justice requires that punish-
ment be regular, effectual, public, and democratically legitimate.20 
Thus, the utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment are not best 
considered moral defences of punishment. They are political theories, de-
fining conditions for the legitimacy of coercive enforcement. Punishment 
cannot be justified by the desert of a particular perpetrator or the utility 
of punishing him. Instead, we must show why it is fair or efficacious to task 
a particular institution with imposing punishment. In short, justifying pun-
ishment is always a problem of justifying the jurisdiction of a particular 
punishing authority. If so, the propriety of punishing a tyrant does not just 
depend on whether he deserves it or whether it is expedient. It also de-
pends on whether there is an institution competent to punish him. 
B CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Modern legal theorists generally view law as a system of social control 
characterized by formal authority and involving acceptance of directives 
merely because of the process by which they are issued. Although legal 
directives are often enforced by coercive sanctions, some influential 
legal theorists deny that this is a necessary feature of legal systems.21 
A ‘rule of law’ is a different matter: it arguably must have teeth. A ‘rule 
of law’ connotes that law is ‘regular’ in its requirements and that it 
‘rules’ – that law is applied and enforced.22 In his influential list of the 
procedural requirements of legality in ‘The Morality of Law,’ Lon Fuller 
includes ‘generality,’ ‘clarity,’ ‘prospectivity,’ and ‘constancy,’ which 
roughly comprise a requirement of regularity. Fuller also includes ‘con-
gruence,’ which means that law must actually be applied.23 The require-
ment that law rule is often contrasted with the rule of man. Albert 
Dicey’s influential formulation of the rule of law includes the idea of 
equality before the law,24 which implies universal subjection to and 
20 Guyora Binder, ‘Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?’ (2002) 5 Buff Crim L Rev 
321 at 350–66. 
21 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 27–40; Jo-
seph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 157. 
22 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Ga L Rev 1 at 14–28. 
23 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1969) at 33–94; David Luban, ‘The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Re-examining 
Fuller’s Canons’ (2010) 2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 29 at 30–1. 
24 Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 5th ed (New 
York: Macmillan, 1897) at 185–7 (rule of law as equality before law). See also, David 
Dyzenhaus, ‘Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice, and the Rule of Law’(2003) 
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protection by law and precludes the direct rule of one person over 
another. To prevent such personal subordination, law must exhaustively 
regulate violence. This is the chief purpose of criminal law. 
Criminal law is distinctive in that a public authority – paradigmatically 
the state – forbids conduct and imposes punishment for committing it. 
Criminal law is integral to a rule of law that suppresses vengeance and 
gives the state a ‘monopoly on legitimate force.’25 Whatever the other 
purposes of criminal law, it asserts public control over the use of vio-
lence. Drawing on both utilitarian and retributivist sources, the remain-
der of this section develops the concept of criminal law as a system of 
public proscription and punishment that regulates violence. 
1 Prohibition 
Criminal law is distinctive in proscribing conduct. Law sometimes at-
taches burdensome legal consequences to conduct without evaluating it. 
Thus, expectation damages in contract merely internalize the promisee’s 
costs in the promissor’s decision whether to perform while permitting – 
even encouraging – efficient breach. By contrast, criminal law does not 
merely attach a consequence to offences. In punishing offenders, it de-
nounces them personally and forces them to suffer deprivation or injury, 
with no direct benefit to anyone else. Moreover, criminal law authorizes 
the use of coercive force, sometimes deadly force, to prevent offences. 
Thus, criminal law disapproves offences ex post and forbids them ex ante. 
Criminal guilt therefore implies not only wrongdoing but also defiance 
of the law.26 Criminal punishment responds by reasserting the authority 
of law.27 It presupposes a prior exercise by someone of legislative juris-
diction to proscribe, conferring on someone executive jurisdiction to 
prevent. 
In the terminology developed by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Mel-
amed, expectation damages and compensatory damages are liability 
rules, whereas a rule that forbids injury is either a property rule or an 
inalienability rule.28 A liability rule imposes a duty to compensate for 
10 Otago L Rev 345 at 358–9, stating that the requirement of civic equality is implied 
by the practice of reason giving, which is in turn implicit in Fuller’s requirement that 
law be intelligible. 
25 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in Hans Heinrich Gerth & Charles Wright Mills, 
eds, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated by Hans Heinrich Gerth & Charles 
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958) at 77. 
26 Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Phi-
losophy, ed by Daniel Farnham (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 79–94. 
27 Ibid at 108–50. 
28 Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089 at 1107. 
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injury but does not forbid injury. Criminal protections of consent such 
as prohibitions against theft and sexual assault may be seen as property 
rules. Criminal injuries which the victim may not authorize by consent 
such as child rape and homicide may be seen as violating inalienability 
rules. 
Why should some conduct be forbidden rather than just priced or dis-
couraged? 
Calabresi and Melamed argue that transfers are likely to be more eco-
nomically ‘efficient’ if they are consensual. They reason that intentional 
injuries should be forbidden by a property rule because it should be pos-
sible to bargain with a known victim and find out how much compensa-
tion that victim will demand before consenting to a specific injury. By 
contrast, the endangerment of many should merely be discouraged by a 
liability rule because it would be too costly for the risk imposer to bar-
gain with all potential victims in advance.29 
Yet there are also dignitary costs to a liability rule when the victim is 
known and the injury is intentional. Ignoring the owner’s will is an insult, 
implying the owner counts for less than the offender. To say that a 
known victim can be bargained with at low cost is to say that the offender 
and victim are already in a communicative relationship such that injury 
without prior communication is nevertheless expressive, conveying a 
message of disrespect. Intentional injury of a known victim is personal 
and is understood as such. 
Not all criminal offences violate individual entitlements. Some violate 
duties to cooperate in the production of public goods. It is often said 
that coercion is required to motivate cooperation because government 
cannot easily bargain with individual defectors by, for example, with-
holding the benefits of public goods like national defence, clean air, or 
safe traffic conditions. Proscribing and punishing morally ambiguous 
regulatory offences associates them with violent crimes against persons. 
Criminal law thereby mobilizes our gratitude for the state’s protection 
against violence and uses it to motivate compliance with other coopera-
tive institutions. Thus, the legitimacy of criminal enforcement of civic 
duties like taxation rests, in large part, on the criminal law’s success in 
protecting individuals from violence. 
2 Punishment 
Criminal law is distinctive not only in proscribing but also in imposing 
punishment. We can define punishment as affliction imposed by an insti-
tution because of blame for committing forbidden conduct. Punishment 
29 Ibid at 1108–9. 
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is a practice of coercion, afflicting the offender regardless of his or her 
wishes. Punishment is unusual as a legal remedy because it inflicts injury 
purposefully, not just as a predictable by-product of some other aim. 
Because punishment afflicts on the basis of blame, it is not only a coer-
cive but also an expressive practice. Punishment denounces an offender 
as responsible for a forbidden act. By thus denouncing the offender, 
punishment implicitly justifies the coercion it imposes as deserved for 
wrongdoing. 
In expressing blame for a previously forbidden act, punishment also 
implies a certain relationship between the offender and a punishing 
institution. The offender is to blame not just for a wrong but also for dis-
obedience. Thus, along with blame, punishment expresses a claim to 
authority, the authority to direct behaviour. Even punishment of children 
within a family has this structure. In punishing, the parent claims legiti-
mate authority as a decision maker for the family and implies that the 
child has violated a justly imposed duty. Thus, to punish is to act in role, 
as an agent of an institution that also imposes obligations on the person 
punished. The wrong it denounces is not just an injury to an individual 
but is also an injury to an institutional interest. In responding to the vio-
lation of a norm, punishment treats the person punished as also an 
agent with institutional responsibilities. Thus, it implies a shared enter-
prise, uniting those subject to the authority of the punishing power in a 
moral community. 
The idea of punishment as an institutionally authorized enforcement 
of a norm helps us to distinguish punishment from revenge. Revenge 
lacks the claim to represent an institution toward which both punisher 
and punished owe a duty of obedience. Revenge can be taken against an 
avowed enemy toward whom one recognizes no duties. It need not be 
motivated by a claim of injustice. Yet revenge can also serve as a custom-
ary response to perceived wrongs. In a fragmented, stateless society, 
revenge may be the only means of redressing a grievance between mem-
bers of different social groups. 
Yet revenge is provocative because, in many cultures, unreciprocated 
force is the prerogative of superiors disciplining subordinates. Thus, vio-
lence is an implicit claim to governing authority that, until requited, sub-
ordinates the victim. In cultures governed by notions of martial honour, 
accepting violence without resistance implies a cowardly acceptance of 
subordinate status and invites further violence.30 Thus, victims face 
30 For classic accounts of honour-based feuding, see Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern 
Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); 
William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law and Society in Medieval Ice-
land (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
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intense pressure to avenge injuries. Because revenge lacks the backing 
of a higher authority, however, it is often experienced as a fresh wrong, 
demeaning the original perpetrator, who is then honour-bound to con-
tinue the dispute by avenging this insult. This destructive dialectic of 
responsive vengeance can continue indefinitely. 
Punishment is designed to end this dialectic by providing an authorita-
tive determination of who is in the wrong. In so far as they accept the 
punishment as authoritative, members of the society deny the signifi-
cance of the injury as an exercise of governing authority over the victim. 
This undoes the damage done the victim’s dignity and restores equality 
of status between perpetrator and victim.31 If an important purpose of 
punishment is to affect the social status of the victim, punishment must 
engage the participation of society’s members in authoritative judgments 
of blame. This authoritative denunciation of the offender’s wrongdoing 
renders the injury to the offender retributive rather than retaliatory. 
Unlike vengeance, punishment is authorized by an institution to 
which the person punished owes allegiance. Punishment removes the 
burden of pursuing vengeance from the victim and precludes the pun-
ished offender’s reasserting the justice of his initial offence by retaliating 
against the victim. If the offender accepts the authority of the punishing 
institution, he can only establish the justice of his position by addressing 
arguments to that institution. 
Adil Haque has proposed that international criminal tribunals can 
help re-establish the rule of law after civil conflicts because opposing 
sides can accept the punishing power as impartial.32 Yet, on our analysis, 
the authority to punish requires more than the appearance of impartial-
ity: it requires the allegiance of those subject to punishment. This condi-
tion may be difficult for international institutions to meet. 
3 Public authority 
In criminal punishment, the punishing institution is a public authority 
to which offender and victim both owe allegiance, typically the state.33 In 
proscribing and punishing, this authority promises to suppress the cyclic 
violence of vengeance by discouraging both provocative and retaliatory 
violence through denunciation and coercion. The public authority also 
obviates retaliatory violence by subordinating the offender to public 
31 Hampton, supra note 27 at 108–50. 
32 Adil Haque, ‘Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist Theory 
of International Criminal Law’ (2005) 9 Buff Crim L Rev 273 [Haque]. 
33 See generally Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values 
(New York: Routledge, 1988), treating justification of criminal punishment as a prob-
lem of political obligation. 
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authority and by recruiting the entire membership of society to 
denounce the offence. The victim’s status is protected everywhere that 
the public authority’s law is enforced. By delegating their power of 
revenge to a state and accepting its exclusive authority to achieve retribu-
tion for offences of violence, private parties cooperate to achieve the 
public good of a rule of law. Blood feuds are a classic collective action 
problem, in which a pattern of individually rational conduct makes 
everyone worse off. A rule of law solves this collective-action problem by 
creating public capacity to resolve disputes.34 
Criminal law transforms private injuries into public wrongs by pro-
scribing and punishing them. By treating the victim’s injury as a matter 
of public concern, criminal law clothes each member of society in an 
equal status of civil dignity or ‘inviolability,’ in Frances Kamm’s terminol-
ogy.35 This transformation of private into public wrongs makes an attack 
on the rights of any member of society an attack on the dignity of all. 
This dignity gives every member of society reason to identify with law 
and that identification can motivate compliance more effectively than 
deterrent threats do.36 
Just as loyalty to the rule of law helps make it effectual, effectiveness in 
suppressing criminality and protecting rights is also important to foster-
ing loyalty to the rule of law. A system of criminal justice that lacks the 
capacity to protect rights regularly lacks credibility in denouncing rights 
violations and restoring victims’ damaged dignity. Competing social 
groups are likely to rely on militias and gangs for protection instead. The 
result is likely to be the vicious cycle of the blood feud rather than the 
virtuous cycle of the rule of law. 
Criminal law, as we have described it, requires an institution with the 
authority to proscribe and to blame and the power to coerce. By system-
atically preventing or punishing degrading violence, criminal law can 
protect the equal dignity of those subject to its proscriptions. By deliver-
ing on this promise of equal dignity, a rule of law can motivate those 
34 There is little evidence that marginally harsher sanctions improve deterrence in a soci-
ety with a functioning criminal justice system; see Anthony N Doob & Cheryl Marie 
Webster, ‘Sentence Severity and Crime’ (2003) 30 Crime and Justice 143 at 181–9. 
However, the absence of such a system in collapsed states, for example, can lead to as-
tronomically high levels of violence, with dire secondary effects on public health and 
welfare; see Randolph Roth, American Homicide (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2009) at 9–10, 18–9. The effectiveness and credibility of a 
rule of law are matters of degree, but there appears to be a ‘tipping point’ below 
which isolated acts of punishment make little contribution to a rule of law. 
35 Frances Kamm, ‘Inviolability’ (1995) 20 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 165. 
36 Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2006) at 178, 269–70. 
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subject to its proscriptions to accept the duty to obey, to join in blaming 
offenders, and to suffer punishment if they offend. General acceptance 
of such duties of cooperation increases compliance and diminishes the 
need for coercion. Thus, both welfarist and retributivist reasoning con-
verge to justify proscription and punishment that promote the public 
good of a rule of law. Yet a rule of law makes a promise to protect equal 
dignity. A legal system ‘unwilling or unable’ to keep that promise argu-
ably has no business exercising criminal jurisdiction. 
III A jurisdictional critique of international criminal liability 
A CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY 
The rule-of-law defence of punishment offered in Part II implies that jus-
tified exercise of legislative jurisdiction to proscribe and judicial jurisdic-
tion to impose punishment also require the capacity to exercise 
executive jurisdiction. This part applies that principle in assessing inter-
national criminal jurisdiction. 
International lawyers usually identify five bases for the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction. The most commonly invoked is territorial jurisdic-
tion, jurisdiction over criminal acts taking place or having effects in loca-
tions where the punishing authority has exclusive effective control. 
Territorially based legislative and judicial jurisdiction presuppose execu-
tive enforcement capacity because the very concept of territory entails 
this. It may be, as Mireille Hildebrandt’s contribution to this workshop 
attests, that digital technology has outmoded the concept of territory.37 
Perhaps exclusive control over conduct in one place is no longer possi-
ble – if it ever was – without exclusive control everywhere. Nevertheless, 
the concept of territory presupposes at least a claim to executive jurisdic-
tion and an aspiration to effective control. 
Other bases of jurisdiction include ‘active personality,’ the jurisdiction 
of a state over the conduct of its nationals wherever committed, and ‘pas-
sive personality,’ the jurisdiction of a state over conduct injuring its na-
tionals, wherever located. Perhaps active personality jurisdiction also 
presupposes a measure of enforcement power, since citizens have enti-
tlements vulnerable to forfeiture, even when they are abroad. ‘Protective 
jurisdiction’ extends to conduct anywhere that injures government inter-
ests, such as the authenticity of its currency or the secrecy of its military 
plans. Universal jurisdiction extends to internationally proscribed con-
duct committed anywhere, perhaps in order to protect such interna-
tional interests as ‘humanity,’ ‘peace,’ or ‘freedom of navigation.’ 
37 Mireille Hildebrandt (2013) 63 UTLJ 198 at 203 [present issue]. 
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In his subtly reasoned book on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, 
Chehtman sets out to identify the principles that can best justify the 
international law of criminal jurisdiction as it stands, but also to propose 
reforming legal doctrines that cannot be thus justified. He takes as given 
that the world ‘is divided into’ self-governing territorial states, and ‘the 
existence of international criminal tribunals.’38 Yet there is an obvious 
asymmetry between these two premises: territorial states are vastly more 
consequential institutions than international criminal tribunals are. The 
jurisdictional principles Chehtman develops to accommodate the impor-
tance of territorial states are quite persuasive. However, they prove 
incommodious for the international criminal tribunals he is also commit-
ted to justifying. 
Rather than basing his conclusions on the sovereign equality of states, 
Chehtman derives the scope of criminal jurisdiction from principles jus-
tifying the power to punish. He explains criminal punishment on a basis 
similar to our rule of law rationale: punishment is justified in so far as it 
contributes to the public good of criminal proscriptions’ being ‘in force’ 
and thereby secures the dignity of a population as persons with legally 
protected rights. The central insight of his book is that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is presumptively illegitimate because law cannot, as a practi-
cal matter, be ‘in force’ where the legislating authority lacks executive 
power to enforce it. Where law cannot be in force, it cannot secure the 
dignity of those it claims to govern. Unable to achieve their justifying 
benefit, extraterritorial proscription and punishment are presumptively 
illegitimate. On this basis, he rejects most extraterritorial applications of 
national criminal law, especially those based on the nationality of perpe-
trators and victims. 
Nevertheless, Chehtman endorses universal jurisdiction to impose 
international criminal liability. He argues that a belligerent state cannot 
be trusted to protect enemy soldiers and civilians in war time against war 
crimes by its soldiers. The criminal jurisdiction of the enemy state is also 
insufficient, he argues, because, while it has the motivation to punish, it 
lacks the capacity. Security against impunity for war crimes, therefore, re-
quires extraterritorial punishment by third states or international tribu-
nals with both the motivation and capacity to punish. Similarly, he 
argues, the territorial state cannot provide the requisite security to its 
own population against grave human rights abuses by its officials. Secur-
ing that population’s dignity also requires extraterritorial application of 
international criminal law by third states or international tribunals with 
the motivation and capacity to punish. 
38 Chehtman, Philosophical, supra note 7 at 2–3. 
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These conclusions seem contradictory. Chehtman does not explain 
why potential victims should think that extraterritorial powers have any 
greater capacity to enforce international criminal law than they have to 
enforce national law. He finds it impossible for anyone to believe that 
the law of one sovereign state can protect her on the territory of a sec-
ond sovereign state – but not impossible to believe that international law 
protects her there. 
Yet, since international law recognizes active and passive personality 
jurisdiction, sovereignty is not necessarily coextensive with territory, and 
there is no logical barrier to the criminal law of one state applying in the 
territory of another state. Thus, we should understand Chehtman’s 
claim that extraterritorial national law lacks credibility as a claim about 
popular consciousness rather than logic. He seems to assume that terri-
torial jurisdiction best promotes feelings of security and dignity because 
ordinary people associate the force of law with territorial control. But if 
so, it seems unlikely that ordinary people think that international crimi-
nal law is ‘in force’ within their own countries, protecting their dignity. 
In short, Chehtman does not convincingly exclude international crimi-
nal liability from his critique of extraterritorial criminal liability as inca-
pable of producing the benefits of law ‘in force.’ 
B LAW ‘IN FORCE’ 
Chehtman grounds the right to punish in its service to the ‘public good’ 
of a system of criminal law ‘in force.’ He reasons that a system of criminal 
law requires proscriptive rules, with punishment of violators authorized 
by the proscribing authority. He adds that applying such a system against 
crimes of violence protects the security of persons and their dignity as 
persons with legally protected rights. 
Although Chehtman’s concept of ‘law in force’ closely resembles the 
concept of ‘rule of law’ developed here, his account of this public good 
differs in an important respect. The present discussion concluded that a 
system of criminal punishment that achieves popular legitimacy tangibly 
improves well-being by motivating compliance, obviating vengeance, and 
enabling cooperation to repair the social status of crime victims. How-
ever, Chehtman equivocates as to how integral these consequences are 
to the good of a system of criminal law’s being in force. To be sure, in ar-
guing that law’s being ‘in force’ justifies punishment, he emphasizes its 
benefits: 
The benefit that a system of criminal laws being in force provides to individuals 
in a given state is hardly trivial . . . In a society which only allows for private self-
defense and retaliation as responses to wrongdoing the situation would quickly 
deteriorate and individuals would end up living in constant fear, as living 
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conditions in failed states tend to illustrate . . . Punishment . . . conveys the mes-
sage that the protection of law is real. 
Furthermore . . . when the criminal law operates in the way advocated here . . . 
it contributes to . . . a kind of order based on the moral significance of . . . 
rights. . . . [T]his sense of dignity and security is arguably an essential compo-
nent of our well-being.39 
Yet, despite the ‘enormous’ benefits he claims for punishment in sup-
pressing violence, obviating vengeance, and banishing fear, Chehtman 
insists that ‘none of these beneficial aspects of the institution of legal 
punishment are necessary to justify’ it.40 
Yet, if ‘law in force’ does not prevent or vindicate many violations of 
legal rights, how does it secure dignity? Chehtman’s idea  is  that  each  act  
of punishment confers dignity on all holders of the right vindicated, by 
definition, because it attributes to them the status of persons protected by 
general laws. On this view, even isolated instances of punishment would 
still honour all members of society by implying that they are protected, 
even if this implication is patently false. If the claim of protection is not 
credible, however, its expression cannot enhance subjective feelings of 
security. Moreover, if the punishing authority cannot mobilize general 
participation in blaming, punishment may not even repair the dignity of 
the victim of the particular crime punished, let alone enhance the dignity 
of anyone else. Both accounts of the public good produced by punish-
ment emphasize its expressive implications. However, in our account, the 
expressive implications of punishment matter because they have conse-
quences for behaviour and for social status. Conceived as social status, dig-
nity is not a hollow consolation but a good people care deeply about. 
Chehtman defends his claim that the justifying benefits of punishment 
do not depend on its consequences by pointing out the ineffectuality of 
punishing international crime in particular: 
[O]ur interest in preventing crimes . . . is  more clearly served by a liberty to stop 
and harm [offenders] . . ., rather than by a power to punish them . . . NATO’s 
military intervention against Serbia, for one, had a much stronger impact on 
stopping crimes being perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia . . . than the estab-
lishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia . . . or  
any other threat of extraterritorial punishment. Indeed, the massacres in Sreb-
renica occurred two years after the creation of the ICTY, and the atrocities in 
Kosovo were perpetrated six years later.41 
39 Ibid at 40–1. 
40 Ibid at 42. 
41 Ibid at 41. 
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Chehtman adds that ‘deterrence is weak in such contexts due to . . . the 
limitation of resources and limited number of prosecutions, [and] the 
lack of political legitimacy of most extraterritorial courts from the point 
of view of the targeted groups or individuals.’42 In flaunting the deficien-
cies of international criminal courts, Chehtman assumes his conclusion. 
He cites their ineffectuality as evidence that effectuality is not an essen-
tial benefit of a system of criminal law in force, so as to later argue that 
international criminal law need not be effectual to be in force. 
C CHEHTMAN’S DEFENCE OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
Chehtman argues that, since enforcement of a system of criminal law 
throughout a territory would enhance the security and dignity of every-
one in the territory, penal jurisdiction should extend to all offences com-
mitted within a territory, regardless of the nationality of the offenders or 
the victims.43 But if criminal law is beneficial, why confine it to a territo-
rial population? 
Chehtman offers three reasons. First, he argues that the population of 
the proscribing state has no very strong interest in the protection of per-
sons in other states.44 Yet it is not obvious why individuals in an arbi-
trarily bounded space have a stronger interest in the welfare of others 
within the boundary than outside it. Do residents of Fort Erie, Ontario 
benefit more from criminal law in distant Vancouver than in nearby Buf-
falo? His other two arguments are more substantial, however. Thus, he 
argues that persons in the other state have an interest in self-government 
which militates against a foreign government’s being able to apply its law 
in their territory.45 Finally, he argues that neither population could have 
a substantial interest in one state’s law protecting the population of 
another state because such a law could not do so effectively.46 
While an individual is abroad, the only system of criminal law that can meaning-
fully contribute to her (relative) sense of dignity and security is the criminal law 
of the territorial state . . . Because of the features of this public good, it cannot 
be enjoyed extraterritorially.47 
Thus, national law cannot be ‘in force’ abroad for the simple reason that 
national governments lack executive power there. Hence, the justifying 
benefits of criminal law depend on its enforceability. 
42 Ibid at 45. 
43 Ibid at 56–9. 
44 Ibid at 58, 60–1. 
45 Ibid at 59. 
46 Ibid at 67–8. 
47 Ibid at 68. 
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In sum, Chehtman’s defence of territorially based criminal jurisdiction 
identifies three conditions for legitimate punishment: self-governance, 
reciprocity, and effectuality. Thus, the law imposing liability on a popula-
tion must have its consent; must aim to protect its members as subjects 
of legal rights; and must have the capacity to do so. These three condi-
tions define a political community whose members cooperate in respect-
ing a scheme of legal rights from which all benefit. Yet Chehtman 
provides no moral reason why that community must be geographically 
discrete. 
Sometimes nearby violence threatens our sense of security and dignity 
more than remote violence, but not always. Members of geographically 
dispersed social groups can feel more affected by remote violence within 
or against their own group than by nearby violence affecting some other 
community. If neighbouring groups habitually engage in reciprocal vio-
lence, they have a common interest in the enforcement of law against 
both groups. But if violence is insular, neighbouring groups may be 
indifferent to one another’s rates of violence. On the other hand, if terri-
tory happens to be an efficient basis on which to organize policing, we 
might have a prudential reason to organize executive jurisdiction along 
geographic lines. If legislative and judicial jurisdictions need to be coex-
tensive with executive jurisdiction to justify punishment, we would then 
have reason to define all three geographically.48 
Because Chehtman prioritizes territory over nationality as a basis of 
criminal jurisdiction, he concludes that crimes committed by and against 
visitors should be punished by the territorial state. On the same pre-
mises, he rejects most extraterritorial applications of active and passive 
personality jurisdiction. 
Yet most of these conclusions can also be justified on the basis of the 
political relationships involved, without giving any intrinsic significance 
to territory. Punishment can be justifiably imposed on nationals who 
offend against visitors because those nationals are punished according to 
laws that are effectively enforced, that protect them reciprocally, and to 
which they have constructively assented. Punishment of locally offending 
visitors also satisfies the requisites of reciprocity and effectiveness as long 
as they are punished under laws which are generally enforced and which 
protect them as well. If they have entered the jurisdiction voluntarily and 
48 An example of such reasoning is the case of R v Hape, [2007] 2 SCR 292, 2007 SCC 26, 
McLachlin J, holding the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom inapplicable abroad on the basis that Cana-
da’s legislative jurisdiction could not extend beyond the limits of its executive jurisdic-
tion. I make a narrower claim, however: that criminal legislative and adjudicative 
jurisdiction should not extend beyond executive jurisdiction. 
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the laws’ proscriptions, procedures, and penalties meet international 
human rights standards, we may deem them to have assented to jurisdic-
tion also. 
Extraterritorial application of passive personality jurisdiction can be 
rejected under these principles because foreigners offending against a 
visitor on foreign territory are neither protected by the criminal law of 
the visitor’s state nor consulted in its legislation, and they have done 
nothing to signal their consent. Moreover, proscriptions directed at for-
eigners on foreign territory are not likely to be enforced systematically 
and so lack the effectiveness required for a rule of law. 
Active personality jurisdiction is somewhat more justifiable. Even 
though the offender’s state lacks executive jurisdiction abroad, offend-
ing nationals are likely to return home eventually. If extended by demo-
cratic legislation to nationals protected from similar offences at home, 
active personality jurisdiction seems compatible with the dignity and self-
governance of those punished. A polity might criminalize offences com-
mitted by its nationals abroad that also violate the law of the territorial 
state, in the interest of good relations. Such punishment might enhance 
protection of nationals from crime if done pursuant to an international 
agreement committing other states to reciprocate. Of course, the justice 
of extraterritorial punishment of nationals abroad depends on the jus-
tice of punishing the same conduct committed at home. 
What about an offence committed between two nationals abroad? If 
active personality jurisdiction is permitted, such an offence would be 
punishable, which seems like the right result. Indeed, Chehtman ap-
proves jurisdiction where one national lures another over the border 
into another country in order to commit a crime with impunity. Yet he 
offers the peculiar rationale that this result is required by the territorial 
principle49 – presumably, required to prevent the territorial principle 
from having implausible implications! The more straightforward expla-
nation for why the interaction between compatriots abroad should be 
subject to their country’s law is that such law defines their mutual obliga-
tions as members of a political community. 
Surprisingly, Chehtman approves extraterritorial application of protec-
tive jurisdiction. He supports punishing foreign officials for espionage 
against our government on their own soil, arguing this would advance the 
common interests of ‘individuals in’ our country (even if they are foreign 
nationals?).50 Yet such a proscription would be undemocratic, non-recip-
rocal, and ineffectual, failing all three of our jurisdictional principles. 
49 Chehtman, Philosophical, supra note 7 at 66. 
50 Ibid at 72. 
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D CHEHTMAN’S ‘JURISDICTIONAL’ DEFENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Chehtman offers a ‘jurisdictional’ justification for international criminal 
liability for two types of crimes: war crimes and human rights abuses 
committed by governments against their own populations. He argues 
that offences are justifiably proscribed and punished by an extraterrito-
rial authority when very grave offences are committed pursuant to gov-
ernment policy.51 He reasons that the government of the territorial state 
cannot credibly proscribe its own wrongs. He adds that, while interna-
tional proscription of official wrongs comes at some cost in self-govern-
ment, this is outweighed by the benefits to security and dignity of there 
being a law ‘in force’ against governmental abuses. He then proceeds to 
argue, on a similar basis, that all states should have universal judicial 
jurisdiction to punish such international crimes: 
[T]he collective interest . . . in a rule being in force against [international 
crimes] . . . warrants conferring upon every state the power to punish those who 
violate that rule. This is required, at least, if these criminal rules are to provide 
any meaningful sense of dignity and security to them. In the absence of a centra-
lized mechanism of distribution of criminal competence for international 
crimes, universal jurisdiction provides us with the closest we can get to these 
rules having any real sense of bindingness.52 
Having endorsed universal jurisdiction to punish international crimes in 
order to maximize enforcement, Chehtman reasons that it may be exer-
cised by international tribunals like the ICC as well as by states. 
This argument is vulnerable to two objections. First, it ignores the abil-
ity of national legal systems to credibly restrain official abuse through 
constitutional norms and structures. To the extent that anyone feels 
secure in her dignity as a subject of rights, it is likely because of national 
law, not international law. Second, it overestimates the contribution the 
possibility of international criminal punishment could make to such feel-
ings of security. Extraterritorial states and tribunals are unlikely to 
enforce international laws against government abuse for the same rea-
son they are unlikely to enforce any other laws within a territorial state: 
because they lack executive authority there. 
On the other hand, we can justify foreign punishment of government 
atrocity on the basis of Chehtman’s normative premises in the unusual 
circumstances when foreign forces justifiably exercise executive author-
ity. Recall that Altman and Wellman argue that a government that at-
tacks its own people loses any claim to represent them or to exclude 
51 Ibid at 101–3, 109. 
52 Ibid at 121. 
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other states from fulfilling the basic responsibilities of government in 
their stead.53 Chehtman agrees that any government is justified in inter-
vening militarily to resist and prevent ongoing atrocities.54 While the cus-
tomary legality of humanitarian intervention remains controversial,55 
even sceptics now accord the Security Council the power to declare a 
humanitarian crisis a threat to peace and security and to organize or 
authorize a military intervention.56 Security Council Resolution 1973, 
authorizing such intervention in Libya and invoking the Libyan govern-
ment’s ‘responsibility to protect,’ illustrates this power.57 In any case, 
Chehtman appears to have no objection to extraterritorial executive juris-
diction to stop grave human rights abuses. 
Once an intervening state has assumed executive power, there is no 
longer any barrier to its achieving the public good of ‘law in force.’ Yet, 
at that point, it no longer needs universal jurisdiction or any other form 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction to punish crime because, as occupier, it 
has succeeded to the powers and responsibilities of the territorial power. 
It can punish international crimes on the same jurisdictional basis that 
authorizes it to punish national crimes.58 So justifying jurisdiction to 
punish international crime is simple, but not necessarily easy. All a state 
need do to earn the legal right to punish atrocity is intervene to put an 
end to it. 
Yet this does not resolve the question of whether these atrocities are 
properly punished as offences against international law. In many cases, 
international criminal liability will be unnecessary because the atrocious 
conduct will have been illegal under national law. States may have incor-
porated international humanitarian law into their military codes, apply-
ing it to captured enemy soldiers as well as their own. Yet even if they 
have not, these international humanitarian law standards may still be 
applicable as domestic common law. All belligerents immunize their 
53 Altman & Wellman, supra note 9 at 76–82. For similar arguments, see Powell, supra 
note 10; Anthony Sammons, supra note 9; Teson, supra note 8. 
54 Chehtman, Philosophical, supra note 7 at 110–3. 
55 See e.g. Simma, supra note 8 at 2–4; Cassese, supra note 8 at 24–5; Michael Byers & 
Simon Chesterman, ‘Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Intervention and 
the Future of International Law’ in JL Holzgrefe & Robert O Keohane, eds, Humani-
tarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003) 177; Jose Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias of R2P’ in Philip Alston & 
Euan MacDonald, eds, Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force, (New York: 
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soldiers from criminal liability both at home and abroad for lawful com-
bat and must draw those standards of lawfulness from some source. 
Whether or not they specifically proscribe crimes against humanity 
and genocide in their national criminal law, all states criminalize such 
abuses by proscribing ordinary offences of violence like murder, sexual 
assault, kidnapping, and torture. Thus, we can redescribe the problem 
of international criminal liability as a court of occupation’s choice as to 
whether to recognize a government policy of atrocity as providing a justi-
fication defence to the officials who carried it out. We can think of inter-
national criminal law as merely precluding courts of occupation 
(including international courts) from enforcing local laws that violate 
international humanitarian or human rights standards. On this theory, 
tyrants could be punished as common criminals under local law.59 An 
advantage of this approach is that liability under national criminal law 
presumptively meets the reciprocity and self-governance conditions for 
legitimate proscription. 
In sum, Chehtman’s premises imply that states may legitimately exer-
cise or delegate to an international tribunal jurisdiction to punish for-
eign government officials for mass murder if they intervene militarily in 
defence of the victims. Having done so, their jurisdiction would no 
longer be extraterritorial. Because occupiers exercise executive jurisdic-
tion, they can realize the public good of law in force. Because extraterri-
torial states otherwise lack such enforcement capacity, however, their 
occasional exercise of judicial jurisdiction to punish the isolated offen-
ders who blunder into their territory would not serve what Chehtman re-
gards as the justifying purpose of punishment. Such punishment cannot 
meet the test of effectuality. 
IV The expressive significance of prosecuting international crimes 
A PROSECUTION AS VINDICATION OF LAW 
From the standpoint of liberal political theory, criminal punishment is ‘a 
form of state violence’60 in need of justification. Criminal punishment 
coerces, inflicts injury, and violates liberal neutrality by imposing official 
value judgments.61 If these transgressions of freedom are justified only 
59 A possible obstacle to such prosecutions would be statutes of limitation in some juris-
dictions. 
60 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 575. 
61 See Guyora Binder, ‘The Culpability of Felony Murder’ (2007–8) 83 Notre Dame L 
Rev 965, 970–1, 1052–9 (tension between retributive punishment and liberal ideal of 
value neutrality). 
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in order to achieve the public good of a rule of law, justified punishment 
must be systematic. This requires both executive power and judicial 
capacity. These requisites are lacking when state and international tribu-
nals exercise extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction to try international 
crimes. 
While extraterritorial states have little reason to respect the sover-
eignty of territorial states that attack their own populations, a right of 
military intervention does not equal a justification for punishment, unless 
exercised. Upon exercising such a right, the intervening state is no longer 
extraterritorial. Absent such intervention, however, a state has no more 
capacity to enforce international criminal law abroad than it has to 
enforce its own criminal law abroad. 
International institutions also lack the enforcement capacity to pre-
vent or systematically punish international crimes. The Security Council 
is a cumbersome, veto-bound executive body. Its jurisdiction over inter-
nal conflicts is controversial because of their contingent relationship to 
international peace and security. The Council’s jurisdiction is even less 
well established over stable dictatorships successfully pursuing policies of 
atrocious repression. There are also political barriers to Security Council 
action, as illustrated by the recent resistance of permanent members 
Russia and China to intervention in the Syrian revolution. 
The institutional capacity of international courts is bound to be 
extremely limited. Unless they are located in the affected territory and 
attached to an occupation force with governing authority and capacity, 
they have little access to witnesses or power to arrest defendants. Yet 
international crimes are, by definition, systemic in their perpetration 
and effects, involving large numbers of victims, participants, and wit-
nesses who will likely fear both prosecution and retaliation from defen-
dants and their supporters.62 Thus international criminal prosecution is 
destined to be radically selective as to the situations it investigates and 
the perpetrators it pursues. It cannot aspire to be even-handed in vindi-
cating the equal dignity of victims. No population is likely to develop a 
sense of security of status, trust in government, or confidence in law 
enforcement because of the few successes of international tribunals. 
Yet, as David Luban argues, the fact that punishment of international 
crime cannot be justified like state punishment – as necessary to vindi-
cate a rule of law – does not preclude its being justified in some other 
way. Luban argues that proscription and punishment of international 
crimes need not meet as demanding a standard of legality, precisely 
62 Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts 6–7 (definitions of genocide and crimes against 
humanity). 
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because the international legal system lacks executive power. It is in less 
danger of using the power to punish to repress dissent or persecute ene-
mies. If international criminal liability cannot achieve the benefits of a 
rule of law, neither can it achieve the harms of tyranny.63 
Luban claims that punishment is not even really the point of interna-
tional proscription of war crimes and domestic atrocities. Advocates of 
international tribunals aim at trials rather than punishments.64 Such 
trials are primarily expressive in function, a kind of ‘political theater.’65 
According to Luban, 
the most promising justification for international tribunals is their role in norm 
projection: trials are expressive acts broadcasting the news that mass atrocities 
are, in fact, heinous crimes and not merely politics by other means. In recent 
years, philosophers have studied expressive theories of punishment; the norm-
projection rationale adds an expressive theory of trials . . . The decision not to 
stage criminal trials is no less an expressive act than the creation of tribunals; and 
the expressive contents associated with impunity . . . are unacceptable . . . The 
point of trials backed by punishment is to assert the realm of law against the 
claims of politics.66 
But is this ‘expressive’ justification for international criminal liability 
sufficiently distinct from Chehtman’s to escape its difficulties? To be 
sure, Luban characterizes prosecution of international crimes as expres-
sive rather than coercive in purpose, but can this expressive purpose be 
achieved without effective enforcement capacity? He compares his 
expressive account of trials to expressive accounts of punishment offered 
by RA Duff and Jean Hampton.67 Yet, in these theories, punishment 
does not merely ‘project norms’ by expressing that the crime was wrong. 
In both theories, punishment expresses that the crime was wrong in dis-
respecting the victim’s dignity as an equal member of a community of 
persons protected by legal rights and in flouting the authority of that 
community’s laws. The last sentence of Luban’s paragraph invokes the 
‘realm of law’ and the need for punishment to vindicate it. It is not clear 
63 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 584–6. 
64 Ibid at 575. Elie Wiesel, for example, proposed that Eichmann be released rather than 
punished after his trial; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’ 
(2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1 at 3 [Koskenniemi]. See also 
Ruti G Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 46–9, 66, 
arguing that representative trials suffice to fulfil the expressive aims of transitional 
justice. 
65 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 576. 
66 Ibid at 576–7. 
67 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 576, citing Jean Hampton & Jeffrie G Murphy, For-
giveness and Mercy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and RA Duff, Trials 
and Punishments (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 235–62. 
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that trials can express the message of legality Luban ascribes to them if 
‘law’ is nothing more than the set for political theatre, a façade with no 
edifice behind it. 
B OTHER EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS 
That trials for international crimes serve an expressive purpose does not 
distinguish them from any other criminal trials because criminal punish-
ment is ordinarily aimed at vindicating the law and the dignity of those it 
protects. Nevertheless, let us consider what other expressive functions 
might justify such trials. I will discuss five potential benefits of trials for 
international crimes: articulation of law, authorization of intervention, 
legitimation of transitional justice, backstopping reconciliation, and 
truth telling. Each of these functions, too, is likely to be undermined by 
a lack of enforcement capacity. 
1 Articulation of law 
Although criminal punishment does not effectively enforce international 
legal norms against atrocity, such law can nevertheless be enforced by 
means of executive power. Trials can explain and justify such exercises 
of power by reference to these legal norms. Thus, the Nuremberg prose-
cutions did not and, given their limited focus on leaders, could not fully 
enforce international prohibitions on war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Nevertheless, these trials usefully articulated legal norms that 
the Allies had already enforced, at great sacrifice, by defeating the Nazi 
regime, destroying its machinery of death, and liberating its surviving vic-
tims. The trials explained the magnitude and importance of this achieve-
ment and could be invoked to justify further actions, such as the political 
reconstruction of the defeated states, the integration of Europe, and the 
creation of the United Nations and other international institutions. 
Thus, by contrast with more recent international prosecutions, the 
Nuremberg prosecutions had the merit of having gained authority from 
and contributed authority to the largely just and efficacious exercise of 
executive power. The prosecuting powers earned a measure of moral 
authority to punish Nazi atrocities because they did something about 
them.68 In so doing, they asserted and exercised something like the gov-
erning authority of a sovereign state. International human rights seem a 
lot more legally authoritative when they are backed by an army. 
The optimism about international law that proliferated in the wake of 
World War II arose in part from the success of the Allied war effort as an 
68 To be sure, this authority was undermined by their own offences, largely left unpun-
ished. 
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experiment in transnational governance, mobilizing entire societies for 
war, coordinating these efforts, and ultimately projecting this collabora-
tive enterprise across the globe. The Security Council was an effort to per-
petuate that alliance and its global leadership, while the United Nations 
project of decolonization was an effort to perpetuate that alliance’s moral 
authority as liberator. We are used to the idea that military mobilization 
fosters nationalism, but in this case, it also fostered internationalism. 
Thus, the Nuremberg trials began at the historic high water mark for 
effective multilateral power, underwritten by the military hegemony of 
the United States. Under these fleeting circumstances, the trials’ mes-
sage that the defeat of Germany represented the enforcement of law was 
credible. 
The difficulty with law articulation as a justification for contemporary 
international criminal prosecution is that the circumstances rendering 
this message credible do not always obtain. Granted, the end of the Cold 
War enabled the resumption of international institution building, some 
experiments with internationally authorized intervention, the formation 
of ad hoc and hybrid international criminal tribunals, and ultimately, the 
formation of the International Criminal Court. Yet the performance of 
the international community in humanitarian crises has been very differ-
ent from its performance during World War II. Although NATO eventu-
ally intervened in Kosovo, there was no effective intervention in Croatia, 
Bosnia, or Rwanda. In these settings, there was no international use of 
force for trials to legitimate as law enforcement. Accordingly, when the 
ad hoc tribunals for these conflicts ‘asserted the realm of law,’ the only 
material embodiments of that law they could point to were the trials 
themselves. This was law articulation without the corresponding reality 
that justified it as truthful. It seems that articulation of law, like vindica-
tion of law, depends on the availability of executive power. 
While punishment of international crime is less justifiable where noth-
ing is done to prevent it, it does not follow that the international commu-
nity is always obliged to prevent it. There are sometimes good reasons, 
both prudential and moral, to eschew humanitarian intervention. Such 
intervention can spread or prolong conflict and lead to foreign military 
rule, bloody insurgency, or state collapse. All of these possibilities pose 
their own humanitarian risks. Yet if we therefore decide it is not really 
necessary to prevent atrocity, it cannot really be so important to punish 
it either. 
2 Authorizing intervention 
Even if an international court cannot command an international police 
force and impose an international rule of law, it might encourage com-
pliance by persuasive means. Thus, even without a credible threat of 
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military intervention, international legal institutions might promote 
democratic transition in conjunction with international civil society. To 
the extent that repressive governments persist because of the recogni-
tion and cooperation of other states, international support for democ-
racy movements might tip the political balance toward change. The 
success of such a movement in one country often emboldens such move-
ments in neighbouring countries with similar societies and regimes. The 
ICC’s indictment of Muammar Gaddafi after the Libyan revolution had 
begun provides an example of the Court’s supporting and seeing its 
judgments ‘enforced’ by civil society.69 
Yet there are reasons for caution. Criminal prosecution will typically 
come too late in the process to help topple a dictator and the threat of it 
may even impede a negotiated transition. Nor would we want the Inter-
national Criminal Court to be driving such a process along. A policy of 
deliberate destabilization and regime change is fraught with humanitar-
ian risks. Revolutions can be bloody failures or lead to anarchy or civil 
war. Not only is the ICC a foreign institution but, unlike a meddlesome 
foreign government, it lacks the military capacity to come to the aid of 
those it may have put at risk. So it should probably only play this role in 
conflicts in which the Security Council has already intervened or author-
ized effective intervention. Such caution is reflected in the Rome Statute, 
which limits the non-consensual jurisdiction of the International Crimi-
nal Court to situations referred to it by the Security Council.70 Yet this or-
dering of the lines of authority between Security Council and 
International Criminal Court largely precludes the Court from authoriz-
ing intervention and limits it to the law articulation function. 
3 Legitimizing transitional justice 
Another purpose of international criminal prosecution could be to help 
secure a democratic transition by helping to build a rule-of-law culture 
in the transitioning state. Recall Adil Haque’s suggestion that interna-
tional courts can assist societies riven by bloody group conflict by provid-
ing an impartial forum for prosecuting atrocity. The international 
community can determine fault and spare the new regime’s courts the 
suspicions and resentments they would provoke by deciding such 
cases.71 Yet the use of an international court for transitional justice also 
poses dangers. First, it communicates that the municipal legal system 
69 For a defence of the ICC indictment of Gaddafi along these lines, see Mark Kersten, 
‘The ICC in Libya: Beyond Peace vs Justice’ (May 10, 2012) online: Justice in Conflict 
<http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/05/10/the-icc-in-libya-beyond-peace-vs-justice/>. 
70 Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts 12, 13. 
71 Haque, supra note 32 at 297. 
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lacks impartiality and legitimacy. Second, the international tribunal may 
be no better equipped than national tribunals to legitimize just verdicts 
to the defeated community. Indeed, it may seek to dramatize its impar-
tiality by prosecuting a few culprits from each side, even where there is a 
vast disproportion between the wrongs committed by the two sides to a 
conflict. 
Once again, an international court’s very limited capacity prevents it 
from enforcing law credibly. Of course, this may be precisely what is 
intended in turning this job over to a foreign court of temporary jurisdic-
tion with squeamish scruples about harsh punishment. The result may 
be, not to legitimize transitional justice, but to outsource the impunity 
required for a peaceful transition. 
4 Backstopping reconciliation 
A fourth approach would give international criminal trials a secondary 
role in facilitating transitions to a rule of law regime. Suppose we think 
the best path to establishing trust and legitimacy after an internal con-
flict is a non-punitive truth commission that incentivizes the culprits to 
self-identify, admit wrongdoing, apologize, publicly acknowledge the dig-
nity of their victims, and implicate their accomplices. As Luban admits, 
‘truth and reconciliation commissions may do a better job’ of fulfilling 
the expressive aims of ‘promoting social reconciliation, giving victims a 
voice, and making a record.’72 Nevertheless, a truth commission argu-
ably requires the stick of criminal prosecution to make the carrot of 
immunity effective. Could the International Criminal Court support the 
transition to a rule of law by backstopping a truth commission in this 
way? Unfortunately, this function requires a prosecutor who can credibly 
threaten to bring lots of prosecutions and a court with the capacity to try 
them. Once again, the ICC’s limited investigative and adjudicative capac-
ity makes it ill suited to this role. 
5 Truth telling 
This brings us to a fifth possibility: that the function of international 
criminal prosecution is not retribution, deterrence, or even the vindica-
tion of individual victims. Instead, it is simply truth telling, documenting 
the wrongs committed and how they occurred.73 If so, again, a non-puni-
tive truth commission may perform this function more comprehensively. 
And comprehensiveness matters because the value of truth can be 
72 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 576. 
73 For discussion of the tensions between truth telling and assigning moral credit, see 
Koskenniemi, supra note 64; Guyora Binder, ‘Representing Nazism: Advocacy and 
Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie’ (1989) 98 Yale LJ 1321. 
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violated by what is not said as well as by what is. Here, I worry that the 
inherent selectivity and limited capacity of international criminal prose-
cution will obscure more than it reveals about what happened. Moreover, 
assignment of the prosecutorial and judicial roles to representatives of 
the international legal community itself communicates something that 
may or may not be true. 
One problem with selective punitive gestures deployed from a safe dis-
tance is that they violate what Ronald Dworkin regards as the distinc-
tively legal virtue of ‘integrity.’74 Integrity is the principle that justice is 
always comparative, requiring consistency of principle across cases and 
even different areas of law. In this context, integrity militates against 
punishing any act in isolation. All crime arises in a social context and all 
criminal liability distorts and simplifies that context in assigning blame 
to individuals. As Mark Drumbl and Darryl Robinson have pointed out, 
this is particularly true of human rights abuses, which are typically com-
mitted on a large scale by organizations and which have systemic 
causes.75 On the other hand, criminal law gives decision makers consid-
erable discretion in assigning individual responsibility for collective be-
haviour. Rules of vicarious liability can distribute blame quite broadly, 
but they can be applied selectively. Thus, opportunistic punishment of a 
few individuals can assign blame for collectively produced injury in mis-
leading ways. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that patterns of human rights 
abuse often arise in societies essentially governed by criminal organiza-
tions. The traits of sociability, conformity, and submissiveness that dis-
courage humans from offending in societies governed by a rule of just 
law also encourage us to collaborate in societies run by thugs.76 If we 
flout social norms by offending in a society governed by a rule of just 
law, we probably deserve to be blamed; but if we yield to social norms in 
a society governed by tyranny and terror, our blame may be attenuated. 
An instructive example here is the agonizing Erdemovic case, decided by 
the ICTY, punishing a Croat recruited into a Bosnian Serb militia under 
somewhat coercive circumstances and then forced at gunpoint to 
74 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 9th ed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1986) at 95–6, 225. 
75 Mark Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of 
Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 99 Nw UL Rev 539; Haque, supra note 32 (roots of humanitar-
ian crises in group conflict); Darryl Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International 
Criminal Law’ (2008) 21 Leiden J Int’l L 925 at 926; see also Koskenniemi, supra note 
64 at 13–6. 
76 See generally Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1974), explaining experimental demonstration of willingness to com-
ply with authoritative directives to harm others. 
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massacre civilians.77 It appears that he later persuaded fellow soldiers to 
disobey another mass execution order and was subsequently shot for it.78 
Thus, had he been killed for futilely refusing the first order, he arguably 
would not have been in a position to save lives by resisting the second 
order. This was one of the ICTY’s few prosecutions, made possible 
because the traumatized offender turned himself in and sought punish-
ment while more blameworthy offenders escaped liability. 
While the absence of a rule of law may dilute the guilt of offenders, it 
also reduces the standing to punish of legal authorities. If other states 
could have saved victims and discouraged collaboration by intervening 
against the tyrants and decided it was inexpedient to do so, they are in a 
weak position to judge those who made an expedient choice to collabo-
rate when they had no such opportunity to opt out. States that were part 
of the web of circumstances that produced atrocity should not later help 
themselves to an undeserved absolution by finding others to blame. 
While the punishing authority expresses evaluations of offenders and 
victims, it also expresses messages about itself in the very act of ascribing 
its evaluations to the law. Joel Feinberg’s famous essay about the expres-
sive functions of punishment actually says very little about blaming offen-
ders or vindicating victims. Instead, it emphasizes claims about the law 
itself. Feinberg discusses four expressive functions: authoritative dis-
avowal, symbolic non-acquiescence, vindication of the law, and absolu-
tion of others. The first three encompass claims that the law forbids the 
offence, does not approve it, and is committed to suppressing offences 
of its kind. The fourth implicit claim, absolution from blame of those 
not punished, applies to government officials as well as private citizens.79 
An implicit message of all criminal liability is that injury to a legally pro-
tected interest was caused by individual culpability rather than social 
conditions created or permitted by official policies. 
These self-congratulatory messages are necessary to punishment’s ben-
eficial consequences. Only by expressing that the law disavows and con-
demns the offender’s act can the offender’s claim to dominion be 
77 Rosa Brooks, ‘Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity & Duress’ (2003) 43 Va J Int’l L  
861 at 863–6; Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Appeal Judgment (7 October 
1997) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), 
online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/case/erdemovic/4#acjug>. 
78 Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic,, IT-96-22-A, Sentencing Judgment (29 November 1996) 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber) at para 
81, online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e. 
pdf>. 
79 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Functions of Punishment’ in Joel Feinberg, Doing and 
Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1970) 95. 
(2013) 63 UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS DOI: 10.3138/utlj.1117-1 
AUTHORITY TO PROSCRIBE AND PUNISH INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 309 
refuted and the victim’s dignity restored. Only by showing its commit-
ment to opposing such acts can the punishing authority reassure other 
potential victims that it will prevent violence when it can and punish vio-
lence when it cannot. Finally, only by condemning the offence as pro-
scribed by generally applicable law can the punishing authority present 
the punishment as impartial retribution rather than partisan revenge. 
Thus, any imposition of punishment as required by law implies a broader 
commitment to enforce a rule of law systematically. It seems the truth 
telling function of the criminal trial is not so easily separated from its law 
vindication function because punishment implies a claim to vindicate 
law. If a tribunal makes such a claim insincerely, it serves neither legality 
nor truth. 
V Conclusion 
Justified criminal punishment is punishment according to law. It requires 
not only desert but the justified exercise of legislative and adjudicative 
jurisdiction by some institution. Such jurisdictional authority depends on 
protecting potential victims and offenders in their dignity as subjects of 
legal rights. Protecting this dignity requires consistent defence and vindi-
cation of such rights. Thus, justified adjudicative criminal jurisdiction 
also depends on the power to make law effective, which is to say the exer-
cise of executive criminal jurisdiction. 
The international community of states has now established an interna-
tional court to occasionally punish grave human rights violations. Yet that 
community – perhaps for good reasons – has not committed itself to 
defend and vindicate international human rights with any regularity. Rea-
lizing human rights worldwide requires much more than denouncing a 
few exemplary perpetrators. It entails the strenuous and morally compro-
mised task of fostering rule-of-law states. Theatrical criminal trials blame 
perpetrators for human rights violations, but they also absolve the inter-
national community that proscribes, prosecutes, judges, and punishes. It 
is not obvious that this symbolic transaction is a net gain. 
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